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In 1981 Alasdair MacIntyre published his famous work After Virtue.58 This work
opens with an invitation to imagine a catastrophe suffered by the natural sciences, a
catastrophe in which laboratories are destroyed, physicists are lynched, libraries are
burned, and the teaching of science is abolished. Some generations later, certain
individuals attempt to revive science, but they have largely forgotten it. They recover the
vocabulary of the sciences from the manuscripts they discover, and they use these
rediscovered terms in reinstituted practices bearing the names 'physics,' 'chemistry,'
'biology,' and so on. But these persons do not fully understand the original meaning of the
scientific terms they have rediscovered. They have only a "very partial knowledge" of the
original meaning of each term. The underlying conceptual system in which these terms
had their original context is entirely lost to this later generation. That however, is not the
strangest aspect of the picture MacIntyre paints. What is disconcerting about this
imaginary scenario is that these persons think that they are doing what scientists prior to
the catastrophe did. They are oblivious to what they do not know. They are like children
who are playing hospital, but, whereas children know that they are only playing hospital,
these persons believe that their play is the real thing.
What is MacIntyre's purpose in laying out this imaginary world? He explains:
The hypothesis which I wish to advance is that in the actual world which
we inhabit the language of morality is in the same state of grave disorder
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as the language of natural science in the imaginary world which I
described.59
The problem that MacIntyre describes is not limited to that subcategory within
philosophy called ethics. How could it be? Ethics is intimately related to our
philosophical conceptions of human nature, teleology, epistemology and metaphysics.
Hence the problem that MacIntyre points to in After Virtue is a disorder within
contemporary philosophical practice, especially as it is ordinarily conceived and
practiced in the university.
Today we find widespread and even severe disagreement among philosophers
concerning the answers to most philosophical questions. Regarding this, MacIntyre
writes,
"On most of the major issues that contemporary academic philosophers
address – and it makes little difference whether their philosophical
teachers were Wittgenstein, Quine, and Davidson or Husserl, Heidegger,
and Derrida – there are currently two or more rival and competing views,
giving expression to disagreements that run deep. There appears in almost
all such cases to be no signs of any future resolution of such
disagreements. Each contending party advances its own arguments,
presents its own understanding of the relevant concepts, and responds to
criticisms and objections in ways that satisfy its standards, but without
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providing those who disagree with anything like what they would take to
be a sufficient reason for withdrawing from their own position."60
In many if not most cases the disagreements appear chronically irresolvable, without
even an imaginable path toward resolution. These disagreements among philosophers
have also contributed to the general disregard for the discipline of philosophy as a truthdiscovering practice, both by those in other areas of academia and in the general public.
This has also led to the marginalization of philosophy as an integrating science in the
university and in society, and its de facto replacement by physics, biochemistry,
neurophysiology, psychology and other similar sciences.61 The chronic and irresolvable
character of these disagreements has contributed over time to a shift in the conception of
philosophy, even the self-conception of philosophy by philosophers, from a truthdiscovering practice to an activity or set of activities unified by a much less clearly
defined nature and end.
Concerning the difference between philosophy as a truth-discovering practice, and
the contemporary conception of philosophy, Hilaire Belloc writes:
"We have used in this connection the word "discovery," in connection
with philosophy. It needs a line of explanation; for the modern world has
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come to use the term "philosophy" to mean something very different from
its true meaning. Philosophy signifies primarily the love of knowledge –
ultimate knowledge upon the ultimate realities; and, by extension, it
especially signifies the solving of questions which the mind puts to itself
relative to the most important subjects with which the mind can deal. Thus
this word "discovery" is especially applicable to the philosophic function –
the action of the mind when it succeeds in philosophical research. … It is
the discovery of a new piece of reality; the establishment of a new
certitude in the place of guesswork. … Now because many of these
questions have seemed at first sight insoluble, there has arisen, from the
beginnings of the philosophic discussion, a sort of imitation of philosophy
which the later Greeks called "sophistry," and of which it is a fair
definition to say that it is the art of making up systems which do not really
solve problems and which are hardly intended to do so by their authors;
which are, in a word, not discoveries, but merely guesses at the best, or at
the worst a mass of verbiage. This kind of stuff, which antiquity early
learned to separate from true philosophy (which is the search for reality
and the definition of it when discovered) has flourished prodigiously …
from the end of the 18th Century to the latter part of the 19th; and to it
most modern educated men … still give the term philosophy today."62
In this respect, we might revise MacIntyre's imaginary scenario, and ask ourselves the
following question: If the practice of philosophy had at some point in recent history been
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replaced by sophistry, how would we know? What would be different? But I do not
intend to answer that question here. Instead I want to focus on why philosophy cannot
simply rest with widespread internal disagreements, and address the problem that
underlies these seemingly irresolvable disagreements. In this paper I draw from
MacIntyre's account of the plain person, and from a consideration of the implications of
the catholicity of philosophy to present a means by which to overcome the seeming
incommensurability of chronically irresolvable philosophical disagreements.
The Catholicity of Philosophy
Philosophy as a social practice distinct from sophistry not only seeks truth; it
seeks agreement concerning the truth. The pursuit of agreement is itself part of the
philosophical pursuit of truth. Of course charity bids us share what we have discovered.
But the pursuit of agreement is intrinsic to the practice of philosophy. That is partly
because our pursuit of philosophical truth is a social pursuit, not merely an individual
pursuit. But the essential social dimension of the practice of philosophy is itself rooted in
the very nature of what it is that the practice of philosophy pursues. Philosophy as a
practice pursues the truths about the reality we share with each other, that is, the world in
which we all live. The very nature of philosophy is to seek out truths about the big
questions, not so much questions about particular times, particular places, particular
causes, particular beings or particular persons, but truths about the nature and origin and
end of time, causality, being, purpose, and person. MacIntyre points this out when he
writes,
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"What is philosophical knowledge knowledge of? It is knowledge of
Truth, the truth concerning "all that exists" and the complex relationships
between the myriad of particular facts that comprise the universe."63
"Human beings in every culture pose fundamental existential questions
about the order of things, about their own nature, and about their place in
the order of things. Every religion advances its own answers to those
questions, such questions as "Who am I? Where have I come from and
where am I going? Why is there evil? What is there after this life?"64
The universality of these questions entails that philosophy cannot rest in the merely
provincial, the ephemeral or the merely individual or subjective. The very nature of
philosophical questions entails that philosophy as a practice must ever seek to be
universal. We can refer to this universality as the catholicity intrinsic to the practice of
philosophy. The philosopher as such seeks answers to questions that are not limited only
to him or to her, in his or her time or place or culture, but are the universal and perennial
questions asked by human persons of all times, places, languages and cultures. That is
why catholicity is intrinsic to philosophy; anything lacking catholicity is something less
than philosophy, at least in philosophy's fullest and most mature expression.
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This does not imply that we must begin our philosophical pursuit by first
divesting ourselves of all our particularity or historical rootedness. On the contrary,
argues MacIntyre, what we in all our particularity, our time, our place, our culture, our
religion, our memories, our tradition, our concrete historical perspective, bring to the
pursuit of philosophical truths is essential to the very success of that pursuit, because the
particularity we bring with us to this inquiry is that through which and in which we find
the universal answers to our philosophical questions.
Precisely because of philosophy's intrinsic catholicity, philosophers by the very
nature of their practice seek agreement with other philosophers concerning the truths of
philosophy. To refuse to seek agreement with other philosophers, or to rest content with
seemingly irresolvable disagreements would be to deny the catholicity of philosophy. It
would do so either by begging off philosophical questions altogether, or by
performatively denying that there are any true answers to philosophical questions, or at
least that those true answers are discoverable by us.
Hence philosophers as such cannot rest content with the present state of discord
and disagreement within philosophy, but must pursue agreement. Yet merely plucking up
our intellectual courage is not enough to overcome the chronic disagreement. We need to
consider the underlying reasons for our internal disagreements, the fundamental points of
disagreement explaining why the present disagreements seem irresolvable. This is one of
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the tasks MacIntyre has taken up over the last thirty years. This is what has brought him
to write about first principles and plain persons.65
The Plain Person as the Material Ground for the Catholicity of Philosophy
The catholicity of philosophy entails that its true answers be the answers to every
human person's deepest questions about reality. But to reach such answers we must
reason in a universal or catholic way. That is, the reasoning by which philosophy reaches
these answers must be accessible, in principle, to every human person, and thus must
begin with premises that are shared either explicitly or implicitly. Without shared
premises, our arguments would beg the question from the point of view of those who do
not share our premises. Hence we must find common ground, a universal common
ground from which to reach conclusions accessible in principle to every human person.
Where do we find this common ground? We find it in what MacIntyre refers to as
the plain person. He has referred to the plain person in multiple places, but here consider
one example. In discussing the 1998 encyclical Fides et Ratio, MacIntyre writes:
"The questions that philosophers ask are, the encyclical declares, questions
that they first ask, not qua philosopher, but qua human being, qua plain
person. They are the same questions as those asked by other plain persons
and every plain person is potentially a philosopher. By asking those
questions rigorously and systematically philosophers therefore, we may
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infer, are to practice their trade, their craft, on behalf of all plain persons.
They contribute to the common good by so doing, just as other plain
persons, say carpenters or farmers, do. So philosophers owe it to other
members of their community to speak and write in such a way that, so far
as possible, what they say is accessible to those who are not academic
philosophers. The philosopher shares with the plain non-philosophical or
pre-philosophical person the need for and the search for truth: for the
truths of everyday life, for the truths to be discovered by scientific
research, for the truth about human goods and about the final human
good."66
MacIntyre points out that the philosopher pursues the answers to philosophical questions
not first as philosopher, but first as human being. The initial starting point of every
philosophical inquiry is the common sense of the plain person, which MacIntyre also
describes here as the pre-philosophical person. Catholicity could not be intrinsic to
philosophy unless there were a shared common ground from which we reason. This
shared common ground is also the shared resource by which seemingly irresolvable
philosophical disagreements may in principle be resolved. The shared common ground is
not only a shared capacity for reasoning, but also a shared body of knowledge acquired in
the pre-philosophical period of every human life.
Regarding this relation of pre-philosophical knowledge to philosophy, Vincent
McNabb writes,
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"We shall therefore define philosophy as organised and supreme common
sense. By common sense we mean two things.; both [understood by] the
people. First we mean "good sense," i.e. the plain view and certitude of the
plain man-in-the-street. If any of the readers of this book do not know
what this "good sense" is, they are plainly disqualified from reading
further into its pages. Indeed they seem to qualify instead of psychological
or medical treatment. Secondly, by common sense we also mean "common
consent." Thank heavens, the majority of mankind (i.e. "the poor," as
Lacordaire used to say) who have daily less and less material goods, still
hold the bulk of the world's sound good sense. … When we have defined
philosophy as organised, supreme common sense, we have not discredited
but have further accredited common sense. If the few who think, or who
think they think, find themselves in opposition to the man on plain matters
of fact, it is not the many, but the few who must mend their thinking.
Philosophy's first duty is to justify mankind's intuitions. In other words,
the philosopher is not the advocate of the devil, but the guardian of the
poor."67
This conception of the relation between the knowledge had by the plain person, and
philosophy, is not widely held today. But it is very much in keeping with MacIntyre's
understanding of the philosopher's relation to, even duty to, the plain person.
One objection to the claim that the common human experience of the plain person
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is that common ground by which seemingly irresolvable philosophical disputes may be
resolved, is that if there were such a common body of knowledge, the chronic and
seemingly irresolvable philosophical disputes that have characterized the contemporary
practice of philosophy would have been resolved. In short, the objection is that such a
hypothesis oversimplifies, and is too facile. According to MacIntyre, the objection itself
oversimplifies the situation, because it overlooks the possible ways in which persons can
diverge from the body of knowledge possessed by the plain person, as I shall now
explain.
The Plain Person and Resolution of the Unresolvable
We know that to avoid begging the question, the premises of our arguments must
at least be plausible to our interlocutors. That is because in order to reason together, we
need to have common ground from which to reason. Rational mutual comparison of
differing philosophical claims requires shared recognition of standards by which these
claims and positions are weighed against each other. The presence of seemingly
irresolvable disagreements among contemporary philosophers calls into question both the
catholicity of philosophy and the availability of common ground by which to resolve
these disagreements. Let's consider the various contexts in which philosophical
disagreements occur.
In his book Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry, MacIntyre lays out four
different theoretical contexts in which justification of an ethical or philosophical claim
can be made. The first is that of the "genuinely uninstructed plain person." The second is
that of the person who understands and shares a virtue-theoretical philosophical scheme
59

that provides an explanatory framework for the ethical principles already operative within
the moral practice of plain persons.68 The third type of context for philosophical
justification, according to MacIntyre, is characterized by a "large degree of
incommensurability." Debate at this third level can take place only by comparing
comprehensive standpoints or paradigms.69 Concerning this third type MacIntyre claims
that "A mistake of much nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Thomism was to
suppose that the task of rational justification against their Cartesian, Humean, or Kantian
adversaries was of the second rather than of this third type."70 In other words, nineteenth
and twentieth century Thomists mistakenly assumed that Cartesians and Humeans and
Kantians shared the same broader explanatory framework. This mistake resulted in a
disconnect, and a seeming irrelevance of the Thomistic arguments. But the Nietzschean
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opponents were not even at this third level in relation to the Thomists. MacIntyre claims
that the Nietzscheans represent a fourth, and most removed level of rational justification
viz-a-viz Thomism. Of this he writes:
"Yet against Nietzschean opponents it would not be enough to recognize
this error. For it may well be the case, and it is in large part to Nietzsche
himself that we are indebted for our understanding of this, that a
philosophical or theological position may be so organized, both in its
intellectual structures and in its institutionalized modes of presentation and
enquiry that conversation with an opposing position may reveal that its
adherents are systematically unable to recognize in it even those errors,
defects, and limitations which ought to be recognized as such in the light
of their own and its standards. When such a situation is encountered …
then yet another task of a fourth kind is added to the work of rational
justification. What has to be supplied is a cogent theoretical explanation of
ideological blindness[.]"71
This fourth level differs from the third in the following respect: with the third the
disagreeing parties can at least compare their overall explanatory systems against each
other. There is a shared implicit rationality by which they both can evaluate their
respective paradigms, by means of shared criteria that not only explain the shared data
but also explain why the other paradigm or theory fails to explain the data sufficiently.
But at the fourth level, there is no present shared criteria showing the superiority of the
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one and the inferiority of the other. This is a case of prima facie incommensurability.
MacIntyre proposes that in such a case, instead of pointing to a shared standard by which
to compare paradigms, we have to explain why those holding the opposing position are
blind.
How is this to be done? Again, given the catholicity of philosophy, this
explanation of blindness cannot be question-begging. It must be an account capable of
being seen and understood by those whom we believe to be blind in some respect. In a
passing phrase elsewhere discussing Aquinas on natural law, MacIntyre gives us an
important clue as to how this may be done. He writes:
"Aquinas … is speaking of a knowledge of the natural law which human
beings have by nature and that, since we are all human beings after all, we
can surely all judge equally of what he says, plain persons and
philosophers or theologians alike. Consider then Aquinas's portrait of the
plain person in relation to the precepts of the natural law. The plain person
initially, as plain child, exhibits his or her knowledge of the principium of
the natural law; which is the principium of practical reasoning, in the same
way that he or she exhibits his or her knowledge of the principle of noncontradiction, that is to say, not in any ability to formulate the principle
explicitly, but by showing a potentiality to do just that, in the way in
which the truth of the principle is presupposed in a multiplicity of

62

particular practical judgments."72
MacIntyre refers to the plain person as initially a plain child, at least like a plain child. No
human person begins philosophical enquiry, or sets off on some particular philosophical
narrative or constructing some philosophical system, without first having been a plain
person, and experienced childhood. And the humility requisite for acquiring the wisdom
of philosophy in the fullness of its catholicity requires of every philosopher that he or she
become as a little child, as it were, remembering the philosophical journey, and always
connecting his or her intellectual movement in such a way that what was known with
certainty to be good and true is retained.
This common ground in the plain person, or the plain child, provides the resource
by which seemingly irresolvable philosophical disagreements can be resolved. Even
though in the fourth level of rational justification, the disagreeing parties seem prima
facie to have no common ground, they each retain memory of the process by which they
themselves moved from the epistemic condition of plain person to their current epistemic
philosophical position. They retain the memory of what they knew as plain children in a
pre-philosophical state. So when faced with seemingly irresolvable philosophical
disagreements, we find here, in principle, by way of memory, a way to move forward by
first moving backward. The disputing parties can, in principle, engage in recollection,
finding common ground in their former selves as plain persons, or even plain children.
From that point they can trace forward their respective paths of philosophical
development from that previously shared common ground, accessible to them by
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recollection. By this mutual recollection they can trace forward their respective
intellectual development until they arrive at the point in the past where their
philosophical paths diverged regarding substantive philosophical claims. At this point of
divergence, they can rationally evaluate their respective intellectual trajectory from
shared common ground. Then, when one position has been shown to be preferable to the
other, according to standards both parties shared at that time, it becomes clear that one
party needs to retrace its steps, as it were, to the point where it took a wrong turn, and get
back on the authentic path of philosophical development.
Notice that in this process of resolving the seemingly irresolvable disagreement
the disagreeing parties are not presently addressing the present disagreement itself.
Instead, they are presently addressing a diverging of their philosophical positions that
took place at some point in the past. And they are presently evaluating this past
divergence, from the shared viewpoint of their former selves as plain persons. In this way
they can engage in what is analogous to the second or third level of rational justification.
This mutual recognition and remembrance of our philosophical development from our
prior plain-person-self to our present philosopher-self is a development we can mutually
evaluate by recollection. And this provides a means, in principle, by which disagreement
at the fourth level of rational justification can be resolved. Only by retrieving the
common ground shared both by plain persons and by philosophers who each began their
philosophizing as plain persons, can such disagreements be resolved.
Implicit in the claim that such disagreements are in principle resolvable in this
way, is the notion that authentic philosophical development from the pre-philosophical
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standpoint of the plain person cannot lead to contradictory or incommensurable positions.
Why should we believe such a notion to be true? The shared starting point of the plain
person includes a common body of beliefs acquired through common human experience,
as well as a common conception of rationality. If that is the case, then whatever
divergences are possible in authentic philosophical development are not ultimately
contradictory, but in fact are different expressions of an underlying shared philosophy.
Authentic philosophical development from the starting point of the plain person may lead
to diversity of expressions of the implicit philosophy possessed by the plain person, but
not to contradictions or incommensurable positions. To deny this is to deny the
catholicity of philosophy, by denying that philosophical questions and their answers are
universal. But the denial of the catholicity of philosophy is not intrinsic to the position of
the plain person, nor can it be arrived at by authentic philosophical development from the
starting point of the plain person.73 The plain person, for MacIntyre, makes use of first
principles that are not the result of arbitrary stipulation but are necessary preconditions
for the very possibility of rational inquiry and ethical practice.74 Denying the catholicity
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of philosophy is not a philosophical claim, but a skepticism equivalent to the
abandonment of philosophy itself. Recovering the relationship of philosophy to its
organic starting point in the plain person provides the resource to maintain the catholicity
of philosophy and overcome the seemingly irresolvable disagreements currently
challenging the legitimacy of philosophy as a truth-discovering practice.
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